Bibliographie
- Auteur nominé au Prix du meilleur jeune économiste 2020
- Publication type: Book chapter
- Book: La Théorie de la firme comme entité fondée sur le pouvoir (TFEP)
- Pages: 613 to 683
- Collection: Library of Economics, n° 26
Bibliographie
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- CLIL theme: 3340 -- SCIENCES ÉCONOMIQUES -- Histoire économique
- ISBN: 978-2-406-09592-7
- EAN: 9782406095927
- ISSN: 2261-0979
- DOI: 10.15122/isbn.978-2-406-09592-7.p.0613
- Publisher: Classiques Garnier
- Online publication: 10-22-2019
- Language: French