




Bayle on *Évidence* as a Criterion of Truth

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Abstract: This paper seeks to answer the following question: was Pierre Bayle a skeptic or a dogmatist about the dominant criterion of truth of his day, namely *évidence*? This paper will proceed by presenting Bayle's evolving accounts of *évidence* in his three most important discussions of that criterion: in his first philosophical work, the *Cours*; in his article "Pyrrhon" of the *Dictionnaire*; and in his last philosophical work, the *Entretiens de Maxime et de Thémiste*.

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