Annexe III

Ch. St German, Doctor and Student, T. F. T. Plucknett, J. L. Barton, Selden Society, London, 1974.

a.St German, Doctor and student, op. cit., p. 83 :

Doctoure) When the fyrste man, [Adam] was create he receyued of god a dowble iye that is to saye an outward and an inward. An outward carnal iye wherby he myght se vysyble thynges and knowe his bodely enemyes and eschewe theym. And an inwarde iye that is the iye of reason whereby he knows things invisible and divine and whereby he myghte se his spyrytuell ennemyes that fyghteth agaynst his soule and [beware of them] and overcome them. And amonge all gyftes that god gaue to man this gyfte is the moste noblest for therby man precellyth all beestis an dis made lyke to the dygnytie of aungellys dyscernynge trouthe from fashede & euyll from good. Wherfore he gothe farre from that effecte that he was made to when he degenerates from his origin and taketh no hede to the trouth : or when he preferreth euyll byfore good. And therfore after Doctouris reason is that power the rational soule that deliberates and dycernyth bytweene good and euyll and bytwene good and better comparynge the one to the other : the whiche also chewsyth vertues louyth god [and fleeth vyces]. And reason is said to be not only cognitive, but also motive. It is called cognitive when it adjuges something to be good or evil and stops short at that point ; but if it proceeds further and indicates something to be good so that it should be done, or bad so that it should be avoided, than it is called motive. Moreover, if it goes further still, and not only indicates something to be good so that it should be done, but also wants it to be done, then it is called free will. For free will comprises reason and will. (Note also that « reason » is sometimes taken in general, and sometimes in a strict sense. In the general sense, it comprehends all that portion of 566the soul considered as distinct from sensuality, containing three powers, namely, mind, will and intellect. In the strict sense it is taken to mean power, as distinct from desire or anger. For it is especially the function of reason to curb and moderate anger lest evil things be desired). (And it is to be noted that reason and intellect are not the same thing, for reason is sometimes right, and sometimes not right ; but intellect is always right. Reason and intellect are not distinct as two separate powers, but as two activities of the same power ; for « intelligere », « to understand », is simply to apprehend things intelligible truth, but « to reason » is to proceed from one thing to that that is understood to another, so as to reach the knowledge of intelligible truth. Hence « ratiocination », « reasoning », for reasoning is the proceeding of the intellect from one point to another, from premise to conclusion.) And reason is called ryghtwyse [and good] for it is conformable to the wyll of god and that is [he fyrst thynge &] the fyrste rewle that all thynges must be ruelyd by and reason that is not ryghtwyse nor strayte : but yet is sayd culpable is eyther bycause she is deceyued with an errour that myghte be ouercome or els through her pryde or slouthfulnes she enqueryth not for knowledg of the trouth that ought to be enquyred. Also reason is deuyded in to two partyes that is to saye in to the hygher parte and in to the lower parte. The hygher parte hedyth heuenly things and eternal reasons what is to be be don and what he prohybyted. And this hygher parte of reason hathe no regarde to transytorye thynges or temporal thyngis : but that somtyme as it were by maner of counceyll she bryngeth forthe heuenly reasons to ordre [wel] temporall thynges. The lower parte of reason workyth moste to governe [wel] temporall thynges. And she groundeth her reasons workyth moste vpon lawes of man and vpon reason of man wherby she concludyth that is to be done that is honest and expedyent to the common welth or not to be done that is honest and expedyent to the commonwelth or not to be done for is to be expedyent for the common welth. And so that [reason] wherby I knowe god and suche thynges as perteyne to god bylongeth to the hygheste parte of reason. And that reason wherby I knowe creatures bylongyth to the lower parte of the reason. Hence the lower part adheres to created things according to moral rules only, and without relation to heavenly rules. While reason is concerned with principles which, as soon as their terms are apprehended and known, cannot fail 567to be known, and cannot be disputed, it may then be called synderesis, irrespective of whether they are principles of speculation or of action, and irrespective of whether they pertain to the higher or the lower part of reason. And reason taken in this sense is always virgin, that is to say it persists ever inviolate, as was said in the preceding chapter. And though these two partes that is to say the hygher parte & the lower parte be won in dede & essence yet they dyffer by reason of theyr working and of theyr offyce as it is one selfe iye : that sometimes lokyth vpward and somtyme downewarde.

b. St German, Doctor and Student, op. cit., p. 87 et s.

« This word conscyence whiche in laten is called conscientia is compowned of this preposicion : cum that is to say in englysshe : with and with some nowne scientia that is to say in englysshe knowledge and so conscyence is as moche to say a knowledge of one thynge with another thynge and so the word says two things, knwoledge by itself and knowledge with another thing. In the first place, conscience says and imports knowledge by itself, and according to this view conscience is a natural act, and is not only cognitive but also motive, and inclines the soul to pursue good and eschew evil. Thus this place is superior to reason, and is conjoined with that higher light of reason which is called sinderesis, so that on this account some doctor such as St Jerome and others would call sinderesis it self, conscience. […] In the second place, indeed, conscience says and imports more appropriately knowledge with something else, that is to say, with some particular act. In that case it imports a certain acceptation on the part of reason, whereby it accepts or reproves some particular thing. And conscyence so taken is no thynge els (strictly speaking) but an apllyenge or an ordering of any science [or knowledge] to some particular acte of man and then it is rather an act than a disposition or a power. And so conscyence taken in this sense is not always in itself right but may sometyme erre [and sometime not erre]. […] All this matter can be more clearly understood by the example of some doctors who frame a sort of syllogism about conscience, of which sinderesis propounds the major thus : “No evil is to be done ”. To that major premise conscience (according to the first description of it, discussed above) agrees with sinderesis without any difficulty. […] There be many dyversyties of men’s conscience (as St 568bernard says) but there is non better then that wherby a man trewly knoweth hym self. If you know many things, then you know all the more certainly that there are many things, then you know all the more certainly that there are many things which you do not know : many men knowe mant [great hygh cunnyng] thyngis : & yet know not them self and trewely he that knoweth no thyng well. […] Also he hath a good and clene conscyence that hath purytie and clennes in his herte trouth in his word & rightwysenes in his dede. And as a lyght is sette in a lanterne that all that is in the house may be seen therby so almyghty god hathe sette conscyence in the myddes of euery resonable soule as a lyght wherby he may discern and know what he ought to do : and what he ought not to do. […] And also that in euery generall rule of the law thou do obserue & kepe equytie all of which is in the law of reason. And yf thou do thus I trust the lyght of thy lanterne [that is thy conscyence] shal neuer be extyncted.

Student : but I pray the shewe me what is that equytie yet thou hast spoken of byfore : and that thou woldest that I shulde kepe.

Doctoure : I wyll with good will shew somewhat thereof ».